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TAGS: [PREL](#) [MOPS](#) [EUN](#) [NATO](#) [USEU](#) [BRUSSELS](#)

SUBJECT: EU CIV/MIL PLANNING AND THE OPS CENTER: SHAPING  
THE OUTCOME

REF: A. BRUSSELS 4686 B. BERLIN 3648

Classified By: USEU polmil officer Jeremy Brenner for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

11. (C) Summary. As EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana and the PSC review papers designed to create a civ/mil planning cell and a capacity to stand up an EU Operations Center, they will consider it in the context of strategic EU efforts to define its future global role in security matters. In line with last year's adopted European Security Strategy (ESS), Solana's focus is on development of the EU's concept of its comparative advantages, with a special focus on the instruments of "soft power" and integrating civilian and military components of crisis management. By pushing for stronger NATO liaison relationships with the EU civ/mil cell, we can help channel its evolution and, in so doing, strengthen joint NATO-EU efforts to integrate civil/military activities rather than emphasize core military activities better left to NATO. End summary.

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December 2003  
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12. (C) A FR-UK-GE paper on civ/mil planning and an EU Operations Center that went to Javier Solana for his consideration in early November 2004, put flesh on the bones of a long-standing EU idea. At the same time that the EU adopted the European Security Strategy (ESS), the December 2003 European Council (Heads of State and Government) invited Solana to "propose the necessary measures for establishing a cell with civil/military components to meet the objectives and comply with the principles" set out in the EU Presidency document entitled "European Defense: NATO/EU Consultation, Planning, and Operations." The Heads of State stressed that this cell should be functional as early as possible in 2004.

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June 2004  
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13. (C) The European Council Conclusions of June 2004 took the idea further, agreeing to work on establishing an EU Operations Center. The Council specified that the Operations Center would not be a standing headquarters, and that the primary option for conducting autonomous military operations would remain National Headquarters. A decision to draw on the "collective capacity" of the EU Military staff would be taken, upon the advice of the Military Committee, in a case where a joint civil/military response is required and no National HQ is identified. The Operations Center's charter would be to plan and conduct operations -- within the spectrum envisaged in the Treaty -- on the scale of Operation Artemis (Note: Operation Artemis involved a deployment of 2000 personnel controlled by an OHQ of 70. End note.) The Council specified that the civ/mil cell and facilities for the Operations Center would be located in the same building as the main structures of the EU Military staff. (Note: Currently, EUMS is housed at 150 Avenue de Cortenburgh in downtown Brussels. End note.)

14. (C) In that same month, ESDP HR Solana presented concept papers that spelled out the mission, functions, and terms of reference of both the civ/mil cell and the Operations Center.

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Civ/Mil Cell  
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15. (C) Under Solana's concept, the civ/mil cell would undertake strategic contingency planning at the initiative of the High Representative or the EU Political and Security Committee. Its mission would be to reinforce the national HQ designated to conduct an autonomous operation, and assist in integrating civilian and military operations. Solana's

concept charged the civ/mil cell with responsibility for creating and maintaining the capacity to stand up an Operations Center capable of planning and running an autonomous EU military operation. That responsibility is vested in a permanent 8-member core staff within the civ/mil cell (also referred to as the "Key Nucleus").

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Operations Center  
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16. (C) On paper, the Operations Center is designed to exist only as an empty room with 60 workstations, and required communications equipment -- until it is activated by a consensus decision of the European Council. The FR-UK-GE paper added a requirement that the EU Military Committee must conduct a risk assessment and make a finding that the operations center is capable of running the operation -- including the risk of escalation. This provision was conceived as one of several institutional "locks" that will provide political limits on the scope and ambition of the Ops Center. This is in addition to the other stipulations on size and location. The latest draft paper dated November 10, prepared by Solana's Council Secretariat staff dropped the requirement for military advice, calling only for an "assessment" that the Ops Center is capable of managing the risks associated with the Operation. If this language remains as currently drafted, it could represent a weakening of the political "locks" put in place in previous versions.

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Looking at the Numbers  
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17. (C) The proposed numbers of personnel designated for the civ/mil planning cell and the Operations Center (detailed ref a) are in keeping with previous estimates, and do not represent a departure from long-standing figures. The Operations Center is designed to be able to support a command element in line with the "scale" of Operation Artemis, in which there were seventy Headquarters staff. The Council Secretariat's November 10 paper calls for a total of 29

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people within the civ/mil planning cell. Of those, 17 would constitute the Strategic Planning Branch, 4 represent the Command Group -- including the Commander and his personal staff, and 8 (including 4 housekeepers) would form the permanent core staff of the Operations Center in the event it is activated. The Strategic Planning Branch is to be operational as of January 1, 2005, while the Key Nucleus staff would become operational in January 2006.

18. (C) It is important to note, however, that the personnel to staff an operation of this size is not actually assigned to the Operations Center; to staff an HQ of the size of Artemis would require transferring military and staff members who currently have other responsibilities in Brussels, as well as augmentation by experts from member states. The FR-UK-GE paper proposed staffing limits: quantitative limitations are not specified in any of the relevant European Council mandates to Solana. Despite some efforts to limit its scope, political desire within the EU to move ahead with this project seems to be unequivocal.

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Defining the Mission  
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19. (C) US and Allied forces currently conduct planning for crisis management and military intervention at a combined force level, and joint force level (inter-service. According to our contacts, the EU civ/mil planning cell and Ops Center would be expected to plan and operate on the equivalent of the US inter-agency level, bringing together the full range of EU "instruments" including Commission experts on law enforcement, development and reconstruction, and civil administration, in conjunction with the required military component to ensure a secure environment in which the other instruments can be successfully deployed.

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Channeling the Effort  
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110. (C) EU planners and political leaders of some member states argue the civ/mil planning cell will provide a capability that has not previously existed by better integrating military tasks with the law enforcement and civil administration challenges that are part and parcel of most regional crises. They frequently speak to us as if this is a new capacity that is lacking elsewhere in the world. They also argue that it goes beyond the capabilities embodied in

NATO's crisis management planning, or our own ability to integrate military, assistance, and political elements in a comprehensive approach to a crisis situation. Those who belong to this school of thought believe in the need for the Operations Center, where all the EU "instruments" brought to bear in a crisis management operation can be coordinated. In many ways, the EU focus is in keeping with the vision expressed by NATO's Strategic Commanders in an August 2004 paper on the military challenges facing the Alliance over the next fifteen years, and offers areas for cooperation rather than duplication.

11. (C) Comment: Solana's strategic goal, supported by EU heads of government, is to carve out a more robust role for the EU on the world stage. To do so, he believes this must include the ability to play a larger role in regional conflicts -- a role that includes not only political declarations and assistance programs, but also an integrated military component in support of the UN Security Council. An EU better capable of handling the full range of challenges arising from failed and failing states is in our interest also, and should be encouraged. In moving ahead, however, Solana is walking a tightrope between countries (led by France) that seek capabilities for the EU that would parallel those of NATO, and those countries (led by the UK, but cheered on by many of our other allies) which still see NATO as the primary structure for "hard security." Sustained US engagement with the EU on the evolution of the civ/mil planning cell and Operations Center can be important in helping ensure that the NATO-EU relationship remains viable for all future operations. To the extent that we can encourage progress in EU "inter-agency" planning, we can help ensure that the civ/mil cell is populated with Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) experts, development and reconstruction planners, and civil administrators rather than military headquarters staff. Such an approach would emphasize the EU's capabilities in "soft power" projection, provide a multiplier for US efforts in the same direction, reinforce the role of NATO (SHAPE) planning for military missions, and forestall development of an EU Operational Headquarters.

McKinley